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ABSTRACT: This paper reports homogenous series of the rate of surplus value for 
the Chinese economy over the period 1956-2015 with a Marxian approach. It finds 
that the rate of surplus value reached the historical peak of the whole period in 2008 
and that the high profitability in the decade before the 2008 crisis had relied on the 
continuous growth in the rate of surplus value. It provides a time series analysis to 
show that the rising wage pressure and value composition of capitalhas restrained 
profitability since 2008. Thus, this paper interprets the so-called “new normal” of the 
Chinese economy as a stage of declining profitability that results mainly from the stag-
nant rate of surplus value and the rising value composition of capital.
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O PICO HISTÓRICO DA TAXA DE MAIS-VALIA E 
O “NOVO NORMAL” DA ECONOMIA CHINESA: 
UMA ANÁLISE DE ECONOMIA POLÍTICA
RESUMO: Este artigo apresenta séries homogêneas da taxa de mais-valia para a eco-
nomia chinesa no período 1956-2015 a partir de uma abordagem marxiana.  Verifica-se 
que a taxa de mais-valia atingiu o pico histórico de todo o período em 2008, e que a alta 
rentabilidade na década anterior à crise de 2008 se baseou no contínuo crescimento da 
taxa de mais-valia. O artigo fornece uma análise de séries temporais para mostrar que 
a crescente pressão salarial e a composição orgânica do capital têm restringido a lucra-
tividade desde 2008. Assim, este artigo interpreta o chamado “novo normal” da eco-
nomia chinesa como uma fase de declínio da lucratividade que resulta principalmente 
da estagnação da taxa de mais-valia e do aumento da composição orgânica do capital.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: taxa de mais-valia; rentabilidade; novo normal; economia 
chinesa.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper reports a homogeneous series of the rate of surplus value (RSV, hereaf-
ter) for the Chinese economy using a Marxian approach. This approach highlights 
the division between productive labor and unproductive labor, and argues that the 
value that unproductive labor obtains is a transfer of surplus value. The origin of the 
approach dates back to classical economists, including Adam Smith, David Ricardo, 
and Karl Marx; in recent decades, Moseley (1985) and Shaikh and Tonak (1994) de-
veloped the approach and made it empirically applicable with statistical data. Some 
country-specific studies have applied the approach and obtained interesting findings 
(CRONIN 2001; MANIATIS, 2005; MOHUN, 2005; MOHUN, 2013; PAITARIDIS 
and  TSOULFIDIS, 2011). This approach is not unfamiliar to Chinese economists, who 
had intensive discussions on the division of productive and unproductive labor from 
the late 1970s to the early 1990s (for instance, YU, 1981; SUN, 1981; WEI, 1981; LUO, 
1990). Chinese economist Luo Gengmo compared the U. N. System of National Ac-
counts and Marxian theories and attempted to establish a statistical system that is con-
sistent with the Marxian division of productive and unproductive labor (LUO, 1990). 
In an earlier paper, I discussed the theoretical issues about the definitions of Marxian 
variables in China’s transitioning economy. I also built series of the RSV for the Chi-
nese economy over an extended period from 1956 to 2014 (QI, 2017), which might be 
the first attempt to build series of Marxian variables for China over such a long period.
In this paper, I replicate the results of the earlier paper and extend the series to 
2015 with recently published China’s official statistical data. More importantly, I make 
use of the series to provide a political economy analysis of the Chinese economic dy-
namics, in particular, the “new normal” stage of the economy. “New normal” in the 
West refers to the conditions of financial markets and advanced capitalist economies 
after the global crisis, which Summers (2015) interpreted as “secular stagnation”. In 
May 2014, President Xi Jinping proposed that the Chinese economy had entered a 
“new normal” phase; however, what the concept means for the Chinese economy is 
ambiguous. The objective of this paper is to understand China’s so-called “new nor-
mal” from the dynamics of the RSV and its crucial role in affecting profitability during 
the reform era. The main findings are: the RSV followed a U-shape from 1978 to 2008, 
reached the trough in 1997, stagnated and slightly fell after 2008. While the RSV in 
China was not as high as that in the U.S.1, it reached its historical peak when the global 
crisis broke out. With a time series analysis, I find that the rising wage pressure and 
1 The RSV in the U.S. was around 3.5 in 2008 (PAITARIDIS and TSOULFIDIS, 2011), compared to 2.6 in 
China. 
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the value composition of capital are the main factors that restrained profitability in the 
“new normal” stage.
In what follows, this paper is organized into four sections. Section 2 briefly intro-
duces the definitions of the RSV and relevant Marxian variables and describes their 
historical trends. Section 3 analyzes what factors affected the net rate of profit during 
the reform era with a time series analysis. Section 4 discusses why these factors have 
restrained profitability since 2008. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. DYNAMICS OF THE RSV IN THE ENTERPRISE SECTOR
This section briefly introduces the definitions of the RSV and relevant Marxian vari-
ables. For a detailed introduction of the calculation procedures and data sources, please 
see Qi (2017). Then, this section discusses the trends of the RSV and relevant Marxian 
variables and discusses the relationship between the RSV and the net rate of profit.
2.1. DEFINITIONS
The division between productive and unproductive labor is a perspective to see how 
the new value of an economy is circulated and distributed, which enables us to trace 
the flow of new value and measure critical Marxian variables (e.g. Marxian value 
added, variable capital, surplus value). Current studies that take the transfer of surplus 
value into account start with restructuring the economy by a division of productive 
and unproductive labor (sectors) and then measure Marxian variables using data from 
input-output tables and GDP accounting. Following this approach, I divide the Chi-
nese economy into productive sectors and unproductive sectors, as shown in Table 1. 
“Productive sectors” means that there are some productive activities in these sectors, 
while “unproductive sectors” means that there is no productive activity in these sec-
tors. A kind of labor is productive if it creates objects of use values, while labor is un-
productive if it only distributes existing objects of use values or maintains social order.
Table 1 – The Chinese Economy from a Marxian Perspective
The whole economy
Enterprise sector Rest of the economy
Productive sector Unproductive sector Agriculture
Self-employment units
Non-profit institutions for scientific research, 
education, culture, and medical services
The state non-enterprise sector
Mining, manufacturing, utilities, construction, 
transportation, post and telecommunications, 
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We focus on the enterprise sector because, first of all, it was the dominant part of 
the economy over the entire period and, secondly, it was a relatively homogenous sec-
tor. Within this sector, the worker-socialist state relation transited to the worker-cap-
ital relation as the economic transition proceeded. Commerce, finance and real estate 
are unproductive sectors in the sense that no productive activity exists in these sectors. 
In China’s state-socialist economy, a part of the surplus value was transferred from 
productive sectors to unproductive sectors, similar to the transfer of surplus value in 
a capitalist economy.
It is noteworthy that Marxian variables describe a capitalist economy. Thus, they 
are not directly applicable to China. China established a state-socialist economic sys-
tem in 1956, when it accomplished the Socialist Transformation, and experienced the 
transition to a capitalism-dominated economic system that started in 1978 and ac-
celerated after 1992. There was no capitalist component in the economy from 1956 to 
1978, and the capitalist component did not play a major role until 1992. Given China’s 
economic transition, can one apply the Marxian conceptions designed for a capitalist 
economy to the Chinese economy, in particular for the period before 1992?
In a capitalist economy, it is the contested terrain in the workplace where exploita-
tion occurs that generates the division between variable capital and surplus value. The 
micro-foundation of China’s state-socialist economy was much different: all means of 
production were publicly owned assets; workers enjoyed job security and various ben-
efits; before 1978, especially during the Cultural Revolution, workers had some rights 
to criticize cadres in factories; the economic inequality between workers and cadres 
were small. Although no capitalist-worker conflict existed in the socialist economy, 
there was a contradiction between workers and the state, between the national prod-
ucts distributed to workers as wages and that submitted to the state as surplus. Raising 
wages could enhance the living standards of workers; nevertheless, the state aimed at 
not only enhancing the living conditions, but also accomplishing industrialization, for 
which accumulation of surplus was obviously a prerequisite. Giving this contradiction, 
the distribution between workers and the state could reflect the contradiction between 
workers’ living standards and the aim of industrialization. For the sake of simplicity, 
admitting the difference between wages and variable capital and that between surplus 
and surplus value, the rest of the paper uses variable capital and surplus value for the 
entire period.
The RSV is the ratio of surplus value (SV) to variable capital (VC). The RSV, SV, 
and VC are given by equations (1)-(3):
 RSV = SV⁄VC (1)
 VC = (1 – α)ECp (2)
 SV = (NVp – VC) + TOt + RYp + RYt (3)
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In equation (2), ECp is the employees’ compensation of productive sectors, con-
sisted of all the wages, salaries, and benefits of workers and managers; α is the share of 
supervisory labor’s compensation in ECp. In equation (3), NVp is the net value added 
of the productive sector, which equals to the sum of ECp, operating surplus and net 
taxes on production; TOt is the total output of the commerce sector, which equals to 
the sum of intermediate inputs, depreciation of fixed capital, employees’ compensa-
tion, operating surplus and net taxes of the commerce sector; RYp and RYt are royalty 
payments paid by productive sectors and the commerce sector to the finance sector as 
intermediate inputs, respectively.
Further, we define u as the share of surplus value extracted by unproductive sec-
tors, σ as the value composition of capital, GRP as the gross rate of profit, and NRP as 
the net rate of profit.
 u = UP⁄SV (4)
 σ = K⁄VC (5)
 GRP = SV⁄K (6)
 NRP = (SV – UP)⁄K (7)
In equation (4), UP is the surplus value extracted by unproductive sectors. In 
equation (5), K is the non-residential capital stock of the enterprise sector, measured 
by replacement costs.
2.2. TRENDS
Figure 1 shows the long-term trend of the RSV. In the Maoist era (1956-1978), the 
RSV fluctuated severely in the 1950s and 1960s and became relatively stable after 1970. 
Those severe fluctuations resulted from the massive accumulation during the Great 
Leap Forward movement (1958-1960) and the economic contractions in the early 
1960s and the early period of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). In the reform era 
(1978 to present), the RSV shows a U-shape before 2009: it had a declining trend from 
1978 to 1997 and then entered a rising trend until 2008. This U-shape of labor’s share 
took place along with fast economic growth and development over the reform era. If 
one considers the RSV as a proxy for distribution inequality, this U-shape of the RSV 
contradicts the Kuznets curve that depicts the relationship between inequality and 
economic development (KUZNETS, 1955). Using top income ratios and distributive 
shares in the national income, Piketty (2014) shows that the experiences of leading 
capitalist economies do not support the Kuznets curve. Here the Chinese facts do not 
support the Kuznets curve either.
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Sources: Data appendix of Qi (2017).
Why did the RSV change in such a U manner? In the early stage of the reform 
era, the reformers undermined the incentive system within the factories of the Maoist 
era featured by nonmaterial incentives and encouraged the adoption of material in-
centives, such as bonuses and piece wages. Workers lost some critical political rights, 
but still enjoyed job security and various benefits. The economic inequality between 
workers and cadres in factories was small, and cadres tended to pursue higher wages 
and more benefits for both workers and themselves. In this situation, without the stick 
of unemployment, material incentives were increasingly ineffective in disciplining 
workers and absorbing surplus labor, which is an important reason for why the RSV 
decreased from 1978 to the 1990s (QI, 2015).
After 1997, despite lower than the RSV of the U.S. economy, China’s RSV grew 
much faster than the latter. The RSV fell from 2.45 in 1978 to 1.59 in 1997 and then 
increased to 2.55 in 2008. The RSV estimated with similar methods for the U.S. 
economy was generally in a rising trend in the post-WWII period, except for the 
period 1964-1974 (PAITARIDIS and TSOULFIDIS, 2011; SHAIKH and TONAK, 
1994); it increased from 2.2 in 1978 to 3.1 in 1997 and 3.5 in 2008 (PAITARIDIS and 
 TSOULFIDIS, 2011). The growth rate of China’s RSV is comparable to that of the RSV 
in the Greek economy. Tsoulfidis and Tsaliki (2014) show that the RSV in the Greek 
economy increased from 1.4 in 1990 to 2.3 in 2004 and after that slightly declined. 
Marina and Moseley (2000) find that the RSV in the Mexican economy grew rapidly 
from 1982 to 1993 at an average annual rate of 1.6%, which, however, is much slower 
than the growth of China’s RSV from 1997 to 2008.
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The upturn of the RSV was possible, thanks to the expansion of the private sec-
tor and the reserve army of labor. Private enterprises use harsh management prac-
tices and disobey the Labor Law on signing labor contracts and restricting working 
hours. Thus the RSV of the private sector is higher than that of the state-owned sec-
tor. The increase of the RSV echoes the falling share of the state-owned sector in 
the economy. In 1997, when the RSV reached its trough of the reform era, the 15th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China accelerated the reform on the 
state-owned sector, consisted of laying off workers, privatizing small and medium-
scale enterprises, and transforming large-scale enterprises into shareholding com-
panies. Meanwhile, due to market competition and profit motivation, state-owned 
enterprises tended to adopt management and employment practices similar to those 
of private enterprises.
The reserve army of labor emerged as migrant workers from rural areas seek jobs 
in cities and the state-owned enterprises laid off massively. Despite a large rural un-
deremployed population, the formation of a reserve army of labor requires institu-
tional changes in both the rural and urban sectors. The de-collectivization of the rural 
economy, the stagnation of rural household income, the expansion of the urban pri-
vate sector, and the tendency of the state-owned sector to replace urban workers with 
migrant workers prepared the necessary conditions for the influx of migrant workers. 
Meanwhile, laid-off workers of the state-owned sector also expanded the reserve army 
of labor. One of the objectives of the drastic reform of the state-owned sector was “in-
creasing efficiency by reducing employment.” In fact, workers had begun to lose their 
jobs even earlier; from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, more than 30 million workers 
lost jobs from state-owned enterprises. Employment of state-owned and state holding 
industrial enterprises dropped by 6% in 1997, by 7% in 1998, and by about 10% each 
year from 1999 to 2003.
The loss of wage and job securities is evident from the comparison of the cyclical-
ity of the RSV in different periods. The RSV was pro-cyclical throughout the entire 
period; however, it was more pro-cyclical in the Maoist era than in the reform era. 
Both the correlation between real GDP growth and the RSV and that between real 
GDP growth and the growth of RSV are higher in the Maoist era than in the reform 
era. Economic contractions in the Maoist era led to a fall in the new value, but also a 
drop in the RSV due to the relatively stable wages and job security. As the transition 
proceeded, economic fluctuations were increasingly relevant to wages and employ-
ment because workers increasingly lost their wage and job securities after the expan-
sion of the private sector, the influx of migrant workers, and the drastic reform of the 
state-owned sector.
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It is noteworthy that the RSV reached its historical peak in 20082, which was even 
higher than that in 1978. At the beginning of the reform era, the reformers gained 
support from workers by raising wages and criticizing that the distribution policies of 
the Maoist era failed to improve the living conditions of workers3. In 2008, when the 
RSV was higher than the 1978 level, it lost its momentum. One may expect that today 
a redistribution of income will also gain support from workers, which is likely to bring 
major institutional changes.
Figure 2 shows the share of surplus value extracted by unproductive sectors, u. 
Given that commerce and finance under the planning economy were small, they did 
not play a significant role in the Maoist era. In the early stage of the reform era, the 
share of surplus value extracted by unproductive sectors rose slightly but was still 
relatively small before 2000. This proportion had increased substantially from about 
20% to about 30% after 2000. A fast growing RSV implies that the economy is likely 
to encounter the underconsumption crisis tendency. The economy had to rely more 
on not only investment and export but also unproductive activities such as commer-
cial and financial activities to absorb surplus value and avoid an underconsumption 
crisis.



































































































































Source: Data appendix of Qi (2017).
2 The RSV increased slightly from 2.55 to 2.57, from 2008 to 2011. 
3 Chinese economists held five conferences on distribution from 1977 to 1979 to criticize the distribution 
and incentive system of the Cultural Revolution and labeled the system “egalitarianism”, “big pot rice”, and 
“doing more work is the same as doing less work” (SU and FENG, 1978).
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Figure 3 shows the value composition of capital, σ. It is noteworthy that the value 
composition of capital shows a slightly downward trend during the reform era before 
2008. One reason for this trend is the changes in the investment priorities of the state 
from heavy industries to light industries; another is the expansion of the private sec-
tor, which concentrates in more labor-intensive industries. After 2008, as the global 
market stagnated and the Chinese economy relied more on investment to sustain eco-
nomic growth, the value composition of capital increased substantially, repressing the 
rate of profit in the overall economy.

































































































































Source: Data appendix of Qi (2017).
Figure 4 shows the gross rate of profit GRP and net rate of profit NRP. As shown in 
Figure 4, both the gross and net rates of profit in the 1950s were extremely high, partly 
because 1952 is the first year in the calculation of capital stock using the perpetual 
inventory method. From 1960 to 1978, the gross and net rate of profit was on average 
33% and 27%, respectively. In the reform era, both rates of profit were stable from 1978 
to 1985, quickly declined from 1985 to 1990, continued to decline slowly from 1990 
to 1999, increased substantially from 1999 to 2007, and declined again after 2007. In 
2014, the gross rate of profit was as low as the level in 2000, and the net rate of profit 
was the lowest of the reform era.
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Source: Data appendix of Qi (2017).
3. A TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS THAT AFFECT PROFITABILITY
Marxian economics sustains that, in a capitalist economy, profitability is crucial to 
capital accumulation and economic growth. Given that capitalism has dominated the 
Chinese economy, profitability is the key to answer why economic growth slowed 
down after 2008 and whether the slowdown is a short-term issue or a long-term trend. 
The last section presents two measures of profitability, i.e. the gross rate of profit and 
the net rate of profit. Given that the net rate of profit is the ratio of the surplus value 
retained by productive sectors and total fixed capital, this measure is more relevant to 
capital accumulation. Although the gross rate of profit is also relevant to capital accu-
mulation, the numerator of the gross rate of profit (i.e. total surplus value) contains the 
surplus value consumed by commercial and financial activities. Thus, in this section, 
we analyze what factors affected the net rate of profit over the reform era.
Using a growth decomposition method, Qi (2017) analyzed the contributions of 
the RSV, the value composition of capital, and the share of surplus value retained by 
productive sectors to the growth of the net rate of profit. The main findings of the 
decomposition are: before 2008, the RSV was the main driving force of the increase 
in profitability, which offset the effect of capital composition; after 2008, the growth 
of capital composition became the main driving force, and its effect was much larger 
than that of the RSV.
Here, we provide a time series analysis on the net rate of profit. Compared to de-
composition, a time series analysis can include not only the variables that appear in the 
definition of the net rate of profit, but also other variables of interest. Nevertheless, the 
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time series analysis has a clear disadvantage: because the reform era has been a 38-year 
long period, the data has at most 38 observations; the limited number of observations 
might affect the robustness of econometric results and the power of unit root tests. In 
particular, the reform era has experienced several major institutional changes, which 
might bring structural breaks to the data. Despite the disadvantage, the time series 
analysis may provide some interesting results, which is comparable to the decomposi-
tion results.
We establish the following long-run relationship:
 NRPt = α0 + α1 WGt + α2 KVt + α3 Ut + α4 CUt + μt (8)
In equation (8), all variables are log-transformed. The dependent variable, NRP, is 
the net rate of profit. WG is the wage gap between a living wage standard and the aver-
age wage, which captures the wage pressure. KV is the value composition of capital. 
U is the share of surplus value extracted by unproductive sectors. CU is a measure of 
capacity utilization, which captures economic cyclicality. α0 is a constant. μ is the error 
term.
As equation (8) shows, we consider four factors that may have an impact on profit-
ability. The first factor is the wage pressure. If the working class gains more bargaining 
power, profits are likely to be squeezed by rising wages. The fall in the profitability 
of the U.S. economy in the late 1960s and 1970s resulted from the rising bargaining 
power of workers in the Golden Age of capitalism (BODDY and CROTTY, 1975). In 
recent years, China also witnessed rising wages, especially the wages of migrant work-
ers, which had been stagnant for a decade. Relevant studies discussed whether China 
had reached the Lewis turning point (e.g. CAI and DU, 2011). Demographic changes, 
rising power of workers, rising minimum wages, and the 2008 Labor Contract Law 
are all possible reasons for the rising wages. We measure the wage pressure with the 
ratioof a living wage standard to the average wage. In China, the average wage does not 
meet the living wage level that is sufficient to sustain the reproduction of labor power, 
which has been a long-lasting problem (LI and QI, 2014). In many private firms, work-
ers have to work overtime to earn overtime payments and increase their total income, 
which allows managers to discipline their employees through allocating overtime op-
portunities among workers. Thus, the gap between the average wage and the living 
wage can measure the relative power of workers: if the gap expands, workers have to 
be more obedient to managers and the wage pressure ought to be weak; otherwise, 
the pressure ought to be strong. We measure the living wage with theaverage urban 
unit (danwei) wage collected by the National Bureau of Statistics, which is a normal 
income level for an urban resident. The unit sector is the formal economy, in which 
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workers have more job security and obtain higher wages. We measure the average 
wage with the average compensation of employees in non-agricultural sectors. Thus, 
the wage gap is the ratio of the average urban unit wage to the average compensation 
of employees in non-agricultural sectors. The wage gap should have a positive effect 
on the net rate of profit.
The second factor is the value composition of capital. In “Das Kapital”, volume 3, 
Marx argued that the rate of profit has a tendency to fall as a result of the rising organic 
composition of capital (MARX, 1981). The organic composition of capital tends to rise 
because mechanization is a crucial way for individual capitalists to expand the market 
share and control the labor process. The value composition of capital, as a measure of 
the organic composition, should have a negative effect on the net rate of profit.
The third factor is the size of unproductive sectors. We measure the size of unpro-
ductive sectors as the share of surplus value extracted by unproductive sectors. Same 
as the second factor, this factor also comes from the decomposition of the dependent 
variable. Unproductive sectors can promote the realization of surplus value and ac-
celerate the circulation of capital. However, unproductive sectors extract a part of the 
surplus value, thus reducing the amount of surplus value for accumulation. Also, the 
expansion of finance (real estate included) – one of the major unproductive sectors 
– may give rise to financialization, which has restrained real investments and job cre-
ation in major capitalist economies (LAZONICK and O’SULLIVAN, 2000; DAVIS, 
2013). With the commodification of housing and the downturn of the real economy, 
China witnessed bubbles in the housing and stock markets. Although China has not 
been financialized as the U.S., the overly expanding financial sector has threatened 
economic stability and growth sustainability. Therefore, the size of unproductive sec-
tors might have a negative effect on the net rate of profit.
The last factor is economic cyclicality. China’s economic growth fluctuated cycli-
cally owing to both internal and external factors. During the reform era, institutional 
changes had an impact on economic growth; when capitalism dominated the econ-
omy, fluctuations of capitalist accumulation also affected economic growth. On the 
other hand, China has become a country integrated into the global economy since 
the early 1990s; the Chinese economy was hit by the Asian financial crisis in the late 
1990s and the global crisis in 2008 and benefited from the boom of major capitalist 
economies in the early 2000s. Capacity utilization can capture the economic cyclical-
ity; however, China has no official statistics on capacity utilization. Thus, we measure 
the economic cyclicality as follows: we take the difference between the Marxian value 
added per worker and its Hodrick-Prescott cyclical component and take the ratio of 
the Marxian value added per worker and that difference. This measureof capacity uti-
lization should have a positive effect on the net rate of profit.
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To avoid spurious regressions, all variables need to be stationary in levels, or all 
variables are non-stationary in their levels but stationary in first differences, and, 
meanwhile, they are cointegrated. Thus, the first step of the analysis is unit root tests. 
Table 2 gives the results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron 
test. The results show CU is stationary in levels and all theother variables are non-
stationary in levels and stationary in first differences, i.e. CU is I(0) and all the other 
variables are I(1). Given that the variables are either I(0) or I(1), the autoregressive-
distributed lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration developed by Pesaran et al. (2001)
is appropriate. This approach uses the bounds test to examine whether a cointegration 
relation exists among a group of variables that are either I(0) or I(1), which is widely 
used in recent empirical studies.
Table 2 – Unit Root Tests
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test
  Intercept Intercept and trend







  Intercept Intercept and trend






Notes: *** and ** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at 1% significance level and 5% significance level, 
respectively.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the estimation results. For the data sources of the variables, please see the data ap-
pendix of Qi (2017).
According to the ARDL approach, equation (8) should incorporate the short-run 
adjustment process:
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β β β β β β∆ t  (9)
In equation (9), Δ means first differences; p and qi are lag lengths; βi are coef-
ficients; and vt is the error term. The bounds test uses the OLS result of equation (9) 
to test the hypothesis β6 = β7 = β8 = β9 = β10 = 0 by comparing the F-statistic with the 
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lower bound and the upper bound of critical values. If the F-statistic is smaller than the 
lower bound, then there is no long-run relationship between levels of the variables; if 
the F-statistic is greater than the lower bound but smaller than the upper bound, then 
the result is inconclusive; if the F-statistic is greater than the upper bound, then there 
is a long-run relationship between levels of the variables.
According to the Schwarz-Bayesian information criterion, lag lengths are (1, 0, 0, 
0, 1) for (p, q1, q2, q3, q4). A key assumption of the bounds test is that the residuals of 
equation (9) must be serially independent. With these lag lengths, there is no serial 
correlation in the residuals (the p value of the Breusch-Godfrey LM test is 0.028).The 
results of the bounds test in Table 3 support that there is a long-run relationship be-
tween levels of the variables. The F-statistic is greater than the upper bound at the 1% 
level of significance. The t-statistic of the error-correction term is also greater than the 
upper bound at the 5% level of significance.
Table 3 – ARDL Bounds Test
F-statistic 7.190***









Notes: ** and *** denotes 5% and 1% significance levels, re-
spectively. The null hypothesis is there is no cointegration. Critical 
values are from the appendix of Narayan (2005).
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the estimation results. For 
the data sources of the variables, please see the data appendix 
of Qi (2017).
Table 4 gives the ARDL regression results. All the signs of explanatory variables 
are expected. The wage gap has a statistically significant and positive effect; the value 
composition of capital has a statistically significant and negative effect; the size of un-
productive sectors has a negative effect, but the coefficient is not statistically signifi-
cant; the contemporary capacity utilization has a statistically significant and positive 
effect. The unit root test shows that the residual of the regression is stationary at the 
5% level of significance, which confirms that there is cointegration relation among the 
variables.
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Notes: ** and *** denotes 5% and 1% level of sig-
nificance, respectively. The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
The lag lengths of regressors are selected according to 
Schwarz-Bayesian information criterion. According to 
the ADF test and PP test, the residual of the regression 
is stationary. According to the Breusch-Godfrey LM test, 
there is no serial correlation. According to the Breusch-
Pagan test, there is no heteroskedasticity.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the estimation re-
sults. For the data sources of the variables, please see the 
data appendix of Qi (2017).
After the ARDL regression, we further estimate the following error correction 
model:





































+ δ6 ECt–1 + ωt (10)
Equation (10) is same as equation (9), except it replaces the level variables in 
equation (9) with the error correction term ECt–1. The coefficient δ6 in equation (10) 
should be negative, which means that ΔNRPt will respond to the deviation from the 
long-run relationship by offsetting the deviation. Thus, a negative δ6 will support that 
there is a long-run relationship between levels of the variables. Table 5 gives the OLS 
regression results of equation (10), which indicates that δ6 is negative and its absolute 
value is smaller than one.
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Table 5 – Error-Correction Representation Results
Dependent variable: ΔNRPt
Short-run effect Long-run effect
ΔWGt 0.256** WGt 1.031***
(2.619) (2.918)
ΔKVt -0.354*** KVt -1.426***
(-4.721) (-3.961)
ΔUt -0.051 Ut -0.205
(-0.862) (-0.912)









Notes: ** and *** denotes 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively. The t-statistics 
are in parentheses.The lag lengths of regressors are selected according to Schwarz-
Bayesian information criterion. According to the ADF test and PP test, the residual of 
the regression is stationary. According to the Breusch-Godfrey LM test, there is no serial 
correlation. According to the Breusch-Pagan test, there is no heteroskedasticity.
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the estimation results. For the data sources of the 
variables, please see the data appendix of Qi (2017).
Table 5 also gives the long-run effect of each factor. The long-run effects of WG 
and KVare 1.031 and 1.426, respectively, which means that 1% increase in WG (KV) 
will raise NRP by 1.031% (1.426). During the period from 2007 to 2015, WG dropped 
by 10% and KV increased by 47%, which has considerably reduced the long-run net 
rate of profit. These results show that rising value composition of capital was the main 
driver for the slowdown of profitability in the long run, which is consistent with the 
decomposition results of Qi (2017). The results also show that the wage pressure had 
considerable impacts on the long-run profitability, although it is not the most effec-
tive factor. Finally, the size of unproductive sectors and economic cyclicality had no 
significant effect on the long-run profitability.
4. UNDERMINED CONDITIONS FOR THE PROFITABILITY AND THE “NEW NORMAL”
The “new normal” of the Chinese economy witnessed the lowest net rate of profit of 
the reform era. The growth decomposition in Qi (2017) shows that the stagnation of 
the RSV and the rise in the value composition of capital were the driving forces for 
the decline in profitability after 2008. The time series analysis in the last section gives 
similar results since the stagnant RSV is related to the rising wage pressure. Then, the 
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question is: why has the RSV been stagnant (or the wage pressure been rising), and 
why has the value composition of capital been rising?
The stagnation of the RSV and the rising wage pressure is a result of the shrinking 
reserve army of labor. As we discussed in Section 2.2, the formation and expansion of 
the reserve army of labor are a key reason for the growth of the RSV in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s. The two primary components of the reserve army of labor are migrant 
workers and laid-offs of the state-owned sector. For the laid-offs, after 2004, the em-
ployment of the state-owned sector turned to be stable, which implies that there was 
little increase in the number of laid-offs. Meanwhile, many of the workers being laid 
off in the 1990s quit the labor force as they reached retirement ages. The other main 
component of the reserve army of labor did not continue to grow after 2008 as fast as 
it grew before 2008. The growth of migrant workers from 2008 to 2014 continuously 
declined (NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 2013; 2015). The share of migrant 
workers in total urban employment was increasing in the 1990s and 2000s; by contrast, 
this proportion became stable after 2008, and slightly declined after 2010. Regarding 
wages, the economy witnessed fast real wage growth. Nevertheless, this increase does 
not imply that workers afford decent living conditions (LI and QI, 2014). Workers still 
have to rely on overtime work to meet the living wage standard and cover the wage 
gap. Given the shrinking reserve army and the wage gap, it is unlikely to reverse the 
rising trend of the real wage.
The fast growth of the RSV in the decade before 2008, on the one hand, under-
pinned the growth of profitability; on the other, it could jeopardize profitability by 
repressing the domestic consumption demand. Thus, the accumulation model in the 
decade before 2008 had to resolve the value realization problem. Export and invest-
ment played a crucial role in maintaining aggregate demand. Zhu and Kotz (2010) 
observe that the economic growth has increasingly relied on export and investment. 
After 2008, as the global capitalism entered into the great recession or secular stagna-
tion, demand for China’s export dramatically declined. As a result, the role of invest-
ment became crucial. The state launched the four trillion yuan stimulus package in 
response to the economic slowdown.The state-controlled banking system supported 
massive investment that concentrated in infrastructure, which could expand aggregate 
demand for enterprises in the short run and enhance productivity in the long term. 
However, infrastructure investment is less profitable, and its positive effect on profit-
ability might concentrate in a few relevant industries (such as steel industry) in the 
short run. As a result, the massive investment greatly increased the value composition 
of capital, which further depressed profitability.
Meanwhile, although the state-controlled banking and the relatively large non-
financial state-owned sector are favorable to carry out massive investment (LO and LI, 
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2011), the rising debt-income ratio along with massive investment might jeopardize 
growth sustainability. The debt-income ratio of the non-financial enterprise sector 
quickly rose from 195% in 2007 to 317% in 2014. The debt of the non-financial enter-
prise sector as a proportion of GDP was stable from 1996 to 2008, but increased from 
98% in 2008 to 149% in 2014. The debt-income ratio of the non-financial sector has 
been the highest among major economies of the world (LI et al., 2015).
To sum up, the massive reserve of labor underpinned the RSV from the late 1990s 
to 2008, which was a result of institutional and power shifts during China’s economic 
transition; in recent years, as the reserve army declined, the RSV stopped increasing, 
although it is still high. The high RSV required the economy to rely more on invest-
ment and export; after 2008, investment became crucial to expanding the aggregate 
demand, leading to a rising value composition of capital. The stagnant RSV and the 
rising value composition of capital jointly caused the slowdown of profitability. To 
recover profitability, China has to make consumption replace investment as the main 
source of aggregate demand. With a stillhigh RSV, it is unlikely to raise the consump-
tion ratio of the economy (unless by increasing household debts, which is unsustain-
able in the long run). Therefore, the low profitability and the “new normal” will last 
until China manages to lower the RSV and restructure the aggregate demand.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper has constructed homogenous series of the RSV using a Marxian approach 
and analyzed the relationship between the RSV and China’s “new normal” featured 
by falling profitability. Dynamics of theRSV resulted from changes in power relations 
determined by a series of economic and institutional factors such as the ownership 
structure of the economy, the formation of the reserve army of labor, the reform of 
the state-owned enterprises and so on. The main findings of this paper are: over the 
reform era, the RSV decreased from 1978 to 1997, increased from 1997 to 2008, and 
then stagnated after 2008. The stagnant RSV (or the rising wage pressure) has been an 
important factor that restrained profitability. Also, given the still high RSV, investment 
has been crucial to sustain aggregate demand after 2008, which gave rise to the drastic 
increase in capital composition. The rise in capital composition has been another im-
portant factor that restrained profitability.
The RSV has been stagnant or slightly falling after 2008. Some important events 
took place along with this change. First of all, the financial and economic crisis that 
initiated in the U.S. led to a recession and stagnation for leading capitalist economies, 
which affected the Chinese economy through the contraction of the demand for Chi-
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na’s exports. China’s economic growth fell behind the increase of wages, leading to 
the decline in the RSV. Secondly, as the decade-long increase of the RSV constrained 
workers’ capacity to maintain decent living conditions, struggles of workers for a living 
wage surged against this background, and the reduction in the reserve army of labor 
also enhanced the bargaining power of employees. Given that the massive investment 
led to a rising value composition of capital, which repressed profitability, and a rising 
debt-income ratio, which jeopardized the growth sustainability, the Chinese economy 
might encounter serious problems to maintain profitability in the “new normal.” Fur-
thermore, the current accumulation model has also challenged the limits of environ-
mental resources as air pollution has become a serious problem for the Chinese peo-
ple. Capital accumulation has overused not only labor power but also environmental 
resources. Under this circumstance, maintaining the current accumulation model may 
prepare conditions for not only an economic crisis but also an ecological crisis. Major 
institutional changes favorable to pro-labor distribution, a wage-led growth model, 
and sustainable development might be a prerequisite to achieving prosperity in the 
future.
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